Add email verification, personal calendar feed, and full SEO implementation
- Customer accounts now require email verification (hashed, single-use, time-limited tokens) before they can request/confirm bookings, with resend flows on login/account/booking widget and rate limiting. - Admins get a private, rotatable iCalendar (ICS) subscription feed of their confirmed bookings and public events, timezone-correct for Europe/Berlin including DST, never exposing meeting passwords. - Adds a full SEO layer: per-page canonical/OG/Twitter metadata with CMS-editable overrides and content-derived fallbacks, a dynamic sitemap.xml and robots.txt driven by real published content, JSON-LD (Organization/LocalBusiness, WebSite, WebPage, BreadcrumbList, Service, Event, BlogPosting) that never fabricates data, and a CMS-managed redirect table for changed slugs. - Global ANOUMA-naming audit: the brand name is never used to label personal account/calendar areas anywhere in the app, CMS, or emails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/**
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* Minimal in-memory fixed-window rate limiter for a single Node process
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* (this app always runs as one process — see server.ts). Good enough to
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* blunt abuse of the email-verification resend endpoint without adding an
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* external store; resets on deploy/restart, which is an acceptable
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* trade-off for this use case.
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*/
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const buckets = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
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// Opportunistic cleanup so long-running processes don't accumulate an
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// unbounded number of stale keys (one per distinct IP/email ever seen).
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const MAX_TRACKED_KEYS = 5000;
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function sweepExpired(now: number) {
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for (const [key, bucket] of buckets) {
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if (bucket.resetAt < now) buckets.delete(key);
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}
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}
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export function checkRateLimit(key: string, opts: { max: number; windowMs: number }): boolean {
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const now = Date.now();
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if (buckets.size > MAX_TRACKED_KEYS) sweepExpired(now);
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const bucket = buckets.get(key);
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if (!bucket || bucket.resetAt < now) {
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buckets.set(key, { count: 1, resetAt: now + opts.windowMs });
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return true;
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}
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if (bucket.count >= opts.max) return false;
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bucket.count += 1;
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return true;
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}
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export function getClientIp(request: Request): string {
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const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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if (forwarded) return forwarded.split(",")[0]!.trim();
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return "unknown";
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
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import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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/** How long a freshly issued email-verification link stays valid. */
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export const EMAIL_VERIFICATION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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/** 256 bits of randomness, hex-encoded — not guessable, never derived from user data. */
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export function generateVerificationToken(): string {
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return randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
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}
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/**
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* Only this hash is ever persisted (see collections/Customers.ts) — the
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* plaintext token exists only in the URL sent by email and briefly in
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* memory while that email is being sent.
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*/
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export function hashVerificationToken(token: string): string {
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return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
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}
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export function verificationExpiryISO(): string {
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return new Date(Date.now() + EMAIL_VERIFICATION_TTL_MS).toISOString();
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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import { getCMS } from "@/lib/payload/getPayload";
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import { hashVerificationToken } from "@/lib/auth/verification";
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const TOKEN_SHAPE = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i;
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/**
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* Verifies a token from a /auth/verify-email/[token] link: looks it up by
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* hash (the plaintext is never stored), checks it hasn't expired, then
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* marks the account verified and immediately clears the hash + expiry so
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* the same link can never be used a second time.
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*/
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export async function verifyEmailToken(token: string): Promise<boolean> {
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if (!TOKEN_SHAPE.test(token)) return false;
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const payload = await getCMS();
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const hash = hashVerificationToken(token);
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const { docs } = await payload.find({
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collection: "customers",
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where: { emailVerificationTokenHash: { equals: hash } },
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limit: 1,
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});
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const customer = docs[0];
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if (!customer || !customer.emailVerificationExpires) return false;
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if (new Date(customer.emailVerificationExpires).getTime() < Date.now()) return false;
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await payload.update({
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collection: "customers",
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id: customer.id,
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data: {
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emailVerified: true,
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emailVerificationTokenHash: null,
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emailVerificationExpires: null,
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},
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});
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return true;
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}
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